Introduction
The Internet increasingly offers a preferred medium for access to video and other types of high value, bandwidth intensive content. Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") have made substantial investments in infrastructure upgrades to satisfy growing demand and to accommodate consumer expectations of having access anytime, anywhere, via any device and in any distribution format. Early adopters of new video delivery technologies expect both wireline and wireless alternatives to "legacy" media to offer on-demand video access instead of "appointment television"
1 that limits access to a specific time, on a particular channel and in a single presentation format.
Already some video content consumers have "cut the cord" and abandoned traditional video media options, such as broadcast, satellite and cable television, replacing them with ondemand options available via the Internet. The terms Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV") 2 1 "A secular trend toward narrowcasting has intensified on the web, as more individuals forsake appointment television for the 'long tail' of online content." Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 110 (Winter, 2010) . 2 IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download video files or view (streaming) video content on an immediate "real time" basis. Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Emergency Petition for Temporary Standstill, DA 10-679, 25 F.C.C.R. 3879 (2010) . Some of the available content duplicates what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering disputes over whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. "Sky Angel has been providing its and Over-the-Top Television ("OTT") 3 refer to the ability of content creators and new or existing content distributors to provide consumers with access to video content via broadband links, in lieu of, or in addition to traditional media. New distribution media have the ability to deliver "mission critical" bits requiring highly reliable conduits for the immediate ("real time") transmission of video content and their instantaneous display. Options such as OTT and IPTV can offer new options for consumers to view high demand, "must see" television, such as live sporting events along with the downloading of files containing less time sensitive and cheaper content.
New media options and the convergence of markets and technologies have the potential to disrupt the business plans of incumbents that rely on a sequence of "windows" for content display that ration access based on willingness to pay. For example, movie access traditionally has run a time sequence starting with theatrical presentation and followed by pay per view, DVD sale, premium cable and satellite channel access, DVD rental, broadband download, etc.
Eventually content distributors accept compensation from broadcast, cable and satellite television advertisers in lieu of direct payments from end users, or in combination with monthly subscriptions.
subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant part of its service offering. Regulation and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009) .
3 "Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require the end user to obtain broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top . . . [services] can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities." Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, n. 48 (2010) .
Broadband networks have the potential to disrupt the video content distribution window regime, because consumers have growing options for achieving access to both lawful and pirated content via multiple screens soon after initial release. Television sets, computer monitors, smartphone screens and tablets offer much of the content previously made available exclusively via the movie screen, or to only one of the other mediated screen options. These options have become available thanks to new commercial video distribution options 4 available from ventures such as Amazon, Hulu, Netflix and YouTube.
On the technological front content transmission speeds have substantially increased making it possible for broadband networks to deliver full motion video content as a file download, the "streaming" of such files without downloading, or the "simulcasting" of live content. As demand for broadband delivery of video content grows, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") need to plan how to upgrade their networks to accommodate ever increasing traffic.
Additionally ISPs consider ways to recoup their investments by extracting higher payments from upstream ISPs and content sources and by diversifying retail service into various tiers, based on network transmission speed, monthly allowance of content downloading and quality of service.
Such price and quality of service discrimination constitutes a fundamental deviation from a tradition of offering a "one size fits all," best efforts 5 routing of traffic. Tiering service, 4 "Many programmers--including both broadcast programmers and non-broadcast programmers--have increasingly begun to circle the wagons with incumbent MVPDs, concluding that they too are better off with a cut of the MVPDs' supra-competitive profits than with the potential wild-west competition enabled by the Internet." Marvin Ammori, Copyright 's Latest Communications Policy: Content-Lock-Out and Compulsory Licensing For Internet Television, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 375, 378 (2010) .
5
"The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a commitment to the 'end-to-end principle.' This principle requires that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 'call'" or a video stream, be treated equally and managed through offering different prices points and other forms of product differentiation lead to a diversified marketplace that some consider biased, closed and not neutral. Advocates for government regulatory intervention worry that biased networks, managed by ISPs legally able to operate in a discriminatory manner, will stifle market entry by innovative ventures while also reducing consumer welfare and the value proposition of an Internet access subscription. Opponents counter that governments should have no authority to interfere with commercially driven negotiations over the terms and conditions under which ventures agree to interconnect networks.
The debate over network neutrality 6 and an open Internet 7 has become quite polarized with advocates seemingly unable to see a compromise that accommodates diversifying consumer 'best efforts' connections. In such a network, data packets pass from one router to another without the prioritization of any particular packets. In practice, this means that Internet traffic reaches its destination at varying times, depending on the traffic levels of the relevant Internet communications links." Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 277-78 (2008) .
6
Network neutrality refers to government mandated nondiscrimination, transparency and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing field among content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that Internet users have unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns such as ISP network management and national security.
wants as well as the need for ISPs and other stakeholders to create new revenue streams that can help underwrite necessary network upgrades and generate profits. The creators, distributors and consumers of Internet-mediated video may consider paying a surcharge for "better than best efforts" of mission critical video bits that deliver "must see" television on a priority basis. To provide a higher degree of confidence that a video stream will arrive on time and with proper quality, ISPs may need to operate biased networks deliberately configured to prioritize video bits, or to provide specific content sources with dedicated pathways that reduce the potential for delay (latency) and other forms of traffic degradation. Arguably such preferential treatment would support an enhanced value proposition for video consumers particularly if ISPs refrain from deliberately devaluing and degrading the quality of service achieved for regular, nonpriority traffic. A broad sense of network neutrality includes concerns about interconnection arrangements, because the availability of a premium delivery option might foreclose the standard and surcharge-free, best efforts option. This paper assesses whether and how ISPs can offer quality of service enhancements for mission critical, must see video without disadvantaging competitors by punishing content creators, distributors and consumers who reject demands for new or more compensation. The 71-89 (2011). paper explains that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") lacks jurisdiction to impose anti-discrimination rules and other types of rules that impose the functional equivalence of common carrier responsibilities on private carriers providing information services. The paper concludes proactive rulemaking may constrain ISPs from devising interconnection and compensation arrangements that benefit consumers and do not result in an unlevel competitive playing field. On the other hand, the paper identifies instances where a regulatory referee remains necessary to offer timely and fair dispute resolution when increasingly likely disputes arise over what constitutes fair network bias particularly for the carriage of bandwidth intensive video content.
II. The Internet Comes of Age
As the Internet has commercialized and diversified, interconnection terms and conditions have changed between ISPs as they explore alternatives to conventional models that classify interconnection as either peering, 8 or transiting. 9 The former typically involves interconnection between high capacity carriers whose transoceanic and transcontinental traffic volumes generally match thereby enabling the carriers to barter network access in lieu of a financial settlement.
Historically smaller carriers have paid transit fees to larger Tier-1 ISPs for the opportunity to secure upstream links throughout the Internet cloud. Peering refers to a barter arrangement for traffic exchange where two Internet Service Providers agree to accept traffic from the other on without the transfer of funds. The carriers agree to a settlement-free arrangement, because traffic volumes generally match.
9
Transiting refers to an exchange of traffic that triggers a financial settlement and transfer of funds. This arrangement typically results when a small carrier needs the services of a larger carrier to reach all Internet carriers and end users.
10
The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available "Paid peering involves all of the same aspects as conventional peering relationships. Peers announce to the rest of the Internet the addresses that their peering partners control, maintain a sufficient number of interconnection points across the country, and maintain the requisite total volume and traffic ratios. The key difference is that one peering partner pays the other partner for its services." Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 95-96 (2010) .
16
"Paid peering, for example, resembles normal peering in almost every respect, except that one network pays the other network even when the exchange of traffic is roughly the same. These more sophisticated agreements reflect the fact that while the traffic exchange may be equal, the cost of maintaining the networks' respective infrastructures may be unequal. ISPs serving a smaller number of large internet content websites (known as 'content networks') have lower costs in maintaining their infrastructure than ISPs serving home users ('eyeball networks'), since residential neighborhoods require more equipment investment (such as wiring) and maintenance than commercial areas. These interconnection agreements create the economic incentives for ISPs to route internet traffic along the lowest-cost paths, which can sometimes have a discriminatory effect on certain types of content, applications, and services. A collection of commentaries and critiques is available at Benton Foundation, Headlines Newsletter; available at: http://benton.org/headlines/newsletter (Feb. 24-27, 2014 
23
"By regulating the terms upon which content providers use their networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could manipulate the flow of information in society. For example, Comcast could conceivably block consumer access to websites like www.comcastsucks.org that criticize the company. Perhaps more realistically, Comcast could block or degrade content and applications like Netflix that compete against its other revenuegenerating services. Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up Internet access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize in providing Internet access alone. Rather, the largest broadband providers are cable and telephone companies, which have incentives to prevent customers from using their broadband connections in ways that threaten their other revenue streams. For example, consumer groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet providers that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make movies available over a broadband connection." Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029 , 1034 (Winter, 2012 . common medium for the delivery of video content, more compensation disputes will arise that have the equal or greater intensity and potential for consumer inconvenience as carriage disputes between content providers and traditional media outlets such as satellite and cable television.
III. Access To, From and Within the Internet Cloud
The Internet is commonly referred to as a "network of networks," 24 because many different carriers agree to interconnect so that users achieve fast and seamless access to content throughout the world. Analogies to a cloud are also used to emphasize the apparent ease with which networks interconnect to form a complete, end-to-end link from content sources at the edge of the cloud, transmission through the cloud and onward delivery to consumers at another network edge. 25 However, when one examines the actual means by which traffic arrives at its final destination, the Internet constitutes a complex array of facilities operated by different carriers using many types of equipment manufactured by a variety of companies over several generations of innovation.
The network of networks and cloud analogies also ignore the complex and potentially contentious matter of financial compensation when a cooperative carrier agrees to route traffic of 24 "The Internet is a global network of networks that has been the platform for revolutionary innovation. The role of the Internet in enabling innovation is not accidental; rather it flows from the Internet's architecture. The key innovation-enabling feature of Internet architecture is comprised of layers, narrowly understood as defined by code or broadly understood as functional components of a communications system." Lawrence B. Solum and Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 816 (April, 2004) . 25 The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks. "The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of "cloud computing"--the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider's computers over the Internet, rather than on a person's desktop computer. barter system called peering where carriers agreed to eschew cash settlements on the assumption that a balance of traffic flows existed, or the view that metering traffic would prove too costly.
Interconnection based on assumed parity of traffic volume and the absence of a need to transfer funds sharply contrasts the models used by telephone companies. These carriers never have used a barter system even when parity in traffic flows existed, or when either or both carriers received subsidies to promote universal service and infrastructure expansion into the 26 The industrial structure of the Internet has tracked four phases:
1) Incubation--government administration, first through the United States Defense Department and later through the United States National Science Foundation and universities and research institutes throughout the world (1980s-1995); 2) Privatization--governments eliminate financial subsidies obligating contractors to assess whether and how to operate commercially (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) 
Commercialization-private networks proliferate as do ventures creating software applications and content that traverse the Internet. The "dotcom boom" triggers irrational, excessive investment and overcapacity (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) ; and 4) Diversification-after the dotcom bust and market re-entrenchment, Internet survivors and market entrants expand the array of available services and ISPs offer diversified terms, conditions and rates, including price and quality of service discrimination needed by "mission critical" traffic having high bandwidth requirements, e.g., full motion video content.
Rob Frieden, Rationales for and Against Regulatory Involvement in Resolving Internet
Interconnection Disputes, 14 YALE L. J. & TECH. 266, 276 (2012) .
hinterland. From the onset of service, financial compensation models for telephone carrier interconnection have relied on a negotiated financial settlement based on actual traffic flows.
27
Over time, as governments have reduced or eliminate subsidies, Internet carriers have recognized the importance of measuring traffic and using financial settlements when traffic volumes lack symmetry. However the migration from peering to payment based transiting has not always occurred smoothly, particularly when commercially driven terms impose new financial obligations on some carriers that previously used the zero payment barter process. In turn these carriers have sought to recoup these costs from end users, particularly the highest volume subscribers.
Internet carriers typically offered an unmetered, "all you can eat" subscription model in the early phases of development and promotion. Now they consider, or already have migrated to, service tiers that place caps on the volume of traffic a subscriber can consume, or slow down transmission delivery speed ("throttling") after a downloading volume has occurred within one month.
28 While arguably more efficient and fair, new metered retail subscription models have See, e.g., Comcast, Acceptable Use Policy for XFINITY® Internet; available at: http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/HighSpeedInternetAUP.html; (reserving the right to throttle traffic, but imposing no downloading cap). triggered much consumer opposition and assertions that tiering discriminates and reduces the value of a subscription.
29
The need for Internet carriers to pay attention to traffic flows and the cost of providing peering and transit services to other carriers evidence the importance of network interconnection and perhaps as well to the risks of disconnections and financial disputes. A carrier dissatisfied with the status quo will seek new and more favorable commercial terms to which other carriers may not readily agree. If negotiations reach an impasse the carriers at least temporarily will no longer interconnect and accept traffic from each other. Such "de-peering" typically can occur without service disruption, because alternative routing arrangements exists with other carriers.
30
However the viability of the alternative carrier option depends on where in the cloud the network disconnection occurs.
The Internet ecosystem operates with highly varying degrees of competition and alternative routing options. Content providers and distributors generally have many options for 29 "Consumers scored a big win today when Time Warner Cable announced it would halt proposed trials of 'metered' Internet broadband services, where users would pay extra for going over 'caps' on the plans they subscribed to.
'It is clear from the public response over the last two weeks that there is a great deal of misunderstanding about our plans to roll out additional tests on consumption-based billing,' said Time Warner Cable CEO Glenn Britt. 'As a result, we will not proceed with implementation of additional tests until further consultation with our customers and other interested parties, ensuring that community needs are being met. interconnection options quickly. But at the retail sector, even consumers with competitive options will encounter some delay and expense in migrating from one carrier to another.
In light of the possibly limited competitive options available for retail Internet access subscribers and their sole reliance on one carrier, the chosen ISP has significant negotiating power with both end users and upstream ISPs. End users may balk at the inconvenience of changing carriers and upstream ISPs will have no migration option at all if they want to secure access to all end users. Put another way, if a single ISP enjoys a dominant market share of the retail market, which occurs in many localities, a substantial portion of the market exclusively relies on that single ISP making it absolutely necessary for upstream ISPs to secure an agreement with that ISP for its delivery of content. A single ISP has the potential to exert exclusive control over access to a majority of the end user market in many places. Content providers and distributors are captive to that ISP in the sense that they must secure delivery to the televisions, computer monitors, smartphones and tablets that access the Internet solely via a single ISP.
32

IV. Expediting Delivery of Mission Critical, Must See Video Bits
As the Internet becomes an increasingly important medium for the delivery of video, the volume of traffic downloaded increases and carriers must increase network capacity to handle the growth. The prospect for disputes over compensation increase when downstream retail ISPs must regularly upgrade capacity, but believe they are inadequately compensated by the ventures stimulating greater download demand. While retail ISPs receive compensation from both end user subscribers and upstream ISPs, they understandably grow frustrated at helping far upstream 32 For a summary of major peering disputes see Jon Brodkin, Why YouTube buffers: The secret deals that make-and break-online video, ARS TECHNICA, (Jul. 28, 2013 ); available at: http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/07/why-youtube-buffers-the-secretdeals-that-make-and-break-online-video/. ventures achieve great commercial success without having the opportunity to capture a share of the increased revenues. Accordingly disputes have arisen and may increase in number when retail ISPs and upstream content sources disagree on the value of the delivery service performed.
Most retail ISPs no longer consider their service as a single unmetered commodity priced on an unmetered basis. As the diversity, value and volume of downloaded content increases, retail ISPs incur higher costs in delivering the content and accordingly seek ways to secure higher payments. For retail subscribers downloading much more content, ISPs can tier service and charge higher rates based on the volume of content downloaded in a month rather than offer a single, "all you can eat" ("AYCE") unmetered rate.
Rather than consider high volume consumers as pesky "bandwidth hogs," retail ISPs have begun to consider them favored customers in light of the greater revenue and profit generated by the higher tiered services offering faster bit transmission rates and a higher monthly download allotment. The retail broadband access subscription increases in value when consumers can avoid "appointment television" 33 access to content at a time prescribed by content creators or distributors and available only on a single broadcast, satellite, or cable channel. With successful migration from unmetered, AYCE service for retail subscribers to a tiered and metered system, retail ISPs have turned their attention upstream to CDNs and content sources such as Netflix 34 for higher payments. "Consumers are changing their viewing habits in favor of 'TV Everywhere.' They no longer make 'appointments' to sit down and view content, and are no longer limited by TV programming schedules. They want content whenever and wherever they are." John Clancy, , Why the Future of TV Is All About Personalization, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2011); available at: http://mashable.com/2011/08/25/tv-mobile-personalization/. 34 "[I]n negotiations that almost never become public, the world's biggest Internet providers and video services argue over how much one network should pay to connect to another. When
A. Broadcast Television Retransmission Consent Disputes
The incentive for Comcast to inconvenience its subscribers to discipline a peering partner parallels what happens when television broadcasters cannot reach closure with cable television operators on the terms and compensation for cable delivery of local broadcast stations. Such "retransmission consent" negotiations sometimes fail to reach closure before the cable company has to stop carriage. Consumer anger at denied access to "must see" television, such as live sporting events, ultimately forces cable operators to capitulate, but content providers, such as CBS and Fox have identified and used new Internet access denial strategies to secure even greater negotiating leverage.
The companies used techniques to identify the Internet Protocol addresses used by broadband subscribers of the cable companies with which they had a retransmission dispute. By identifying these subscribers' identities, the companies succeeded in blocking cable broadband subscribers' access to video content available at the CBS and Hulu web sites. These content creators had a perverse incentive to deny access to eager viewers despite a reduction in audience ratings and the commensurate impact on advertising revenues. The companies understood that they had more to gain from higher cable television operator retransmission fees and willingly these negotiations fail, users suffer. In other words, bad video performance is often caused not just by technology problems but also by business decisions made by the companies that control the Internet." Jon Brodkin, Why YouTube buffers: The secret deals that make-and breakonline video, ARS TECHNICA (July, 28, 2013): available at: http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/07/why-youtube-buffers-the-secret-dealsthat-make-and-break-online-video/. Many carriers, which no longer qualify for peering with the largest multi-national, long Even interconnections at Internet Exchange facilities have the potential for dispute. "High-profile flare-ups between content providers and broadband providers over traffic exchange are becoming an annual or even semi-annual Internet tradition. The latest flare-up is between Cogent Communications, which provides backbone connectivity for Netflix, and Verizon. But this time there's a new issue embedded in an old issue.
The old issue is how to deal with traffic imbalances between broadband providers and content providers who tend to send more traffic to broadband providers than they receive from them. The new issue pertains to a new approach to solving those traffic exchange problemsallowing the content provider to put servers in key broadband provider connection points, thereby minimizing the distance content has to travel between the two companies. The goal is to the number of peering partners, a process commonly referred to as multihoming, to reflect diversity in the available traffic routing options. 'I don't think settlement-free peering is going away,' said a Tier 1 ISP executive. What's changing is that new charging agreements are becoming available, he said. Paid peering is one of them, but there are others that fall between the extremes of free peering and paying for transit, he said." Paid Internet Peering on the Rise, Disputes Possible, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY (July 1, 2013); available at: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~misra/news/CD070113.pdf.
Comcast was able to demand and receive payments, despite previously having executed peering agreements that did not trigger a transfer of funds. "Informally, a two-sided market can be thought of as a meeting place that brings together two distinct user groups, each of which benefits from the presence of the other. Examples include auctions, credit cards, dating bars, newspapers, video game consoles, and the Yellow Pages. No car auction would be possible without the presence of buyers willing to purchase and sellers willing to sell vehicles; thus, auctioneers must set their commissions to make sure there are a sufficient numbers of buyers and sellers at a given auction. In the case of heterosexual 'singles' bars, bar owners must attract both men and women and often set different prices for men and women to attract each gender in the desired proportions. Newspapers derive their revenues from both subscribers and advertisers; thus, the prices that newspapers set for subscribers and the prices they set for advertising space must be calibrated due to the fact that Retail ISPs can leverage access from the Internet cloud downstream to end users, but also upstream from their subscribers. ISPs serving end users appear to benefit from a superior bargaining position, because they operate the first and last mile needed to originate and complete delivery of high value, must see video content. For end users, the retail ISP can demand compensation for broadband access to the Internet cloud where desirable content resides. For upstream ISPs, CDNs and content sources the retail ISP controls access to customers who have paid for such content and now await its timely delivery. Without adequate regulatory oversight nothing prevents retail ISPs from making paid peering-and the surcharge it incorporates-standard operating procedure. In other words ISPs might try to eliminate the plain vanilla "best efforts" routing option by making it so prone to congestion and high latency that even low volume upstream ISPs and content sources see the need to migrate to a higher quality of service arrangement and price. Retail ISPs can demand similar payments from other content providers and distributors backed up by a not so veiled threat that it simply will not have adequate downstream delivery capacity to accommodate even traffic flows that it previously handled without congestion and a surcharge demand.
Such contrived congestion forces almost every upstream venture, with the financial resources available, onto some type of premium service provisioning. In other words retail ISPs might nudge or push upstream carriers and content sources onto a "Most Favored Nation" quality of service making it the default standard, even though retail ISPs previously accommodated increasing network demand without upstream carrier surcharges. Retail ISPs either absorbed the cost of upgrades as a cost of doing business, but now they more likely can leverage network upgrades in exchange for higher interconnection fees.
Perhaps other content providers, generating less traffic, may continue to squeeze by with standard best efforts routing. But why would a competitor of Netflix risk the consequences knowing that retail ISPs can operate biased networks with the readily available option of throttling, degrading and creating artificial congestion without regulatory agency sanction. Bear in mind that retail ISPs can create problem bitstream delivery problems without their broadband subscribers knowing the cause and the responsible party. Consumers can complain all they want about a reduced value proposition from their $30-75 monthly subscription payments, but competitive carriers are scarce and unlikely to refrain from such higher rent extraction options themselves.
B. Consumer Impacts of a Net Biased Ecosystem
ISPs now offer alternatives to traditional best efforts neutrality with better than best efforts quality of service enhancements at a higher price. Such discrimination has an upside benefit for consumers, particularly ones seeking real time streaming of bandwidth intensive video content. Consumers, or more likely their content providers, seeking enhanced "shipping and handling" can now pay for it. ISPs, operating the first and last mile broadband link, should have the opportunity to offer enhanced quality of service options, provided they do not structure their networks to all but guarantee as unusable the previous standard best efforts option.
The possibility exists that retail ISPs will succeed in generating higher revenues from See, e.g., Ina Fried, In Wireless First, AT&T Says It Is Ready to Offer "Toll-Free" Data, RE CODE (Jan. 6, 2014) ; available at: http://recode.net/2014/01/06/in-wireless-first-att-says-itis-ready-to-offer-toll-free-data/. surge in broadband demand points to the potential for consumers to experience degraded service.
Depending on who frames the issue, congestion, or at least slower bit transmission speeds have become more frequent because of expanded video content availability, including the option of streaming and entire season rather than on a weekly installment basis.
C. Limited Regulatory Oversight
On two separate occasions a reviewing court has largely rejected efforts by the Federal 
VI. The Way Forward
As the Internet becomes an increasingly predominant medium for video content delivery interconnection and compensation disputes will become more frequent. Already one can draw parallels between disputes between television broadcasters and cable television operators on one hand and disputes between content sources and downstream ISPs on the other hand. In the former consumers are denied access to desirable video content, but the parties typically reach a settlement before consumers become too inconvenienced, or they miss access to "must see television" such as the regular season of the National Football League. In the latter, the stakes increase, because consumers have an increasing and recurring demand for "mission critical bits" such that any blockage or degradation becomes offensive immediately.
Consumers have a right to expect that their significant monthly broadband subscription payments entitle them to reliable and high quality service, not contingent on whether the retail ISP succeeds in its demands for surcharges from specific carriers and content sources. But without a regulatory safeguard, retail ISPs can immediately punish holdouts and their consumers immediately with network bias that translates into degraded service. Most consumers may not know how vulnerable their Internet access can be to service interruptions whether caused by real, or artificial congestion. Nothing prevents a retail ISP from retaliating when an upstream carrier, or content source, refuses to pay a surcharge, or to migrate to paid peering. End users may quickly complain about service degradation, but they have limited recourse in terms of shifting carriers, or demanding that their broadband provider solve the problem quickly.
Retail ISPs clear have a right to recoup higher costs, including the network upgrades made necessary by increased downloading of bandwidth intensive video content. The problem lies in the absence of safeguards that limit retail ISPs to reasonable types of price and quality of service discrimination, based on actual differences in the cost of service, versus pressing their negotiating leverage and control of the last mile to achieve anticompetitive goals and to price gouge.
Commercial negotiations, unfettered by regulatory agency intrusion, constitutes the preferred arrangement for arties to anticipate and resolve disputes. However, the likelihood of 
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"The Midwest Video II cable operators' primary "customers" were their subscribers, who paid to have programming delivered to them in their homes. There, as here, the Commission's regulations required the regulated entities to carry the content of third parties to these customers-content the entities otherwise could have blocked at their discretion. Moreover, much like the rules at issue here, the Midwest Video II regulations compelled the operators to hold open certain channels for use at no cost-thus permitting specified programmers to "hire" the cable operators' services for free. Given that the cable operators in Midwest Video II were carriers with respect to these third-party programmers, we see no basis for concluding that broadband providers are not similarly carriers with respect to third-party edge providers." Verizon v. FCC at 54.
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FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) .
